On July 12 I wrote about predatory structured settlement purchasers who buy out periodic payments to the disabled–those who need the funds over their lifetime–for 30-40 cents on the dollar. On July 16, the New York Times published a story entitled, “After N.F.L. Concussion Settlement, Feeding Frenzy of Lawyers and Lenders.” The article describes predatory sales pitches to former NFL players “who stand to receive checks from the largest legal settlement in sports history, a pool of money that may top $1 billion for retirees who sued the league for lying to them about the dangers of concussions as they got their heads pounded on the field.”
The stench of $1 billion has attracted lenders offering tens of thousands of dollars that would be paid back from the settlement payouts–commonly called “lawsuit loans” or “pre-settlement funding.” All they ask in return is 40% interest, which can completely consume any recovery from the settlement, according to the article.
Lawsuit lending is the “before” equivalent of structured settlement purchases, and often preys on a person’s desire for immediate gratification, or worse, their need of funds for healthcare or other essentials, even though there may be far more financially sound solutions.
The New York attorney general filed suit against RD Legal Funding, LLC, a lawsuit lending company based in New Jersey who allegedly targeted NFL players with “severe neurological disorders.” Reporting by the New York Times explains:
This type of lending against a settlement payout is part of a legal but largely unregulated business focused mostly on victims in personal injury cases. The loans, though, have potentially devastating trapdoors, most notably the high interest rates that kick in immediately after money is advanced, and can cut deeply into the sum a player might ultimately receive in a settlement.
Some financial watchdogs accuse the lenders of preying on people who are sick or who, in the case of the N.F.L. retirees, have memory problems or other cognitive ailments that could mean they cannot fully grasp the terms of the loans, which often require the players’ lawyers to provide consent.
Whether before a settlement or after, there are numerous companies waiting to prey on those in the greatest need, and those who are least able to protect themselves. Sadly, it works.
We recently handled a fraud and consumer protection case against two structured settlement purchasers that settled in about four months, one for a confidential amount and one for a several hundred thousand dollar gross recovery. While I cannot yet go into case specifics, below are some words of caution about a predatory and insular industry operating within Washington courts for settlements originating all over the country.
The vast majority of plaintiffs spend their settlement funds in the blink of an eye, relatively speaking. Numbers vary depending on the study, but generally about 90% of settlement beneficiaries dissipate most or all of a lump sum settlement within five years. Sometimes clients spend the money wisely. But because almost no one is accustomed to receiving a large chunk of money all at once–larger than any amount they have ever seen–more often than not a significant portion is blown on frivolous stuff.
For this reason, many lawyers negotiating large claims discuss with clients the need to plan ahead. We are not financial advisors, but we encourage clients to explore their opportunities with appropriate experts.
One of the most common avenues lawyers mention is a structured settlement (“SS”). In a SS, the defense insurer agrees to pay a lump sum to purchase an annuity that makes periodic payments on a schedule chosen by the settlement beneficiary, usually over decades, including interest. A SS affords significant tax benefits under 26 U.S. Code § 130 and 26 U.S. Code § 104(a). Many lawyers believe a SS protects the beneficiary’s funds over the long term.
Unfortunately, for every smart financial move there is a business willing to take advantage of it. 26 U.S. Code § 5891 allows “factoring transactions,” or sales, of structured settlement benefits. Thanks to these businesses, for a lump sum “advance” your client can sell some or all of his benefits for 30-40 cents on the dollar, or the equivalent of a 15-20% interest rate (like a college student’s first credit card) on a totally secure transaction (like a high equity home mortgage).
Washington’s Structured Settlement Protection Act (“SSPA”), RCW 19.205, offers some protections. The SSPA requires that any proposed transfer be approved by a judge with findings that the “transfer is in the best interest of the payee,” and that the “transfer does not contravene any applicable statute or the order of any court.” RCW 19.205.030. None of the Act’s provisions may be waived, and complying with the SSPA is “the sole responsibility” of the SS purchaser. RCW 19.205.060(1) and (6).
Like many laws, however, the SSPA is only as good as the information applied to it. SS purchasers that petition for these sales often do little or no investigation before certifying that the transfer does not contravene the order of any court and is in the best interest of the SS beneficiary. Worse, some willfully ignore and conceal contrary information to obtain court approval, such as the SS beneficiary’s disability or a minor settlement order in another state placing permanent restrictions on the transfer of funds. Some SS purchasers then have the gall to argue that the enforceability of a fraudulently obtained transfer order is subject to an arbitration clause, and is outside the jurisdiction of the court signing the order.
Remember that like Washington, other states provide jurisdiction for SS sales on settlements originating elsewhere. A Washington SS could be sold in another state based on inadequate investigation and/or concealment by the purchaser. Even within Washington courts, the system could improve. For example, in King County LCR 40.1 sets all minor/disability settlement approvals before Ex Parte/Probate, whereas LCR 40(b)(14) puts structured settlement transactions under RCW 19.205 before Chief Civil. The judges deciding what to do with minor/disability settlements, and why, may not be able to foresee how a proposed sale is determined, and the judges deciding on a proposed sale may not be as intimately familiar with the unique interests and options of minor and disability settlements.
For any structured settlement involving a minor or disabled person, you should consider whether or not restrictions on sale/transfer are appropriate. If so, the settlement agreement and any court order approving settlement should contain language that the beneficiary “shall not have the power to transfer or sell benefits,” either at all or except under very specific conditions or circumstances. Some jurisdictions require this disempowerment language rather than language merely prohibiting sale.
Common conditions on sale include that the “advance” be used only to fund education, or for compelling financial need. I would also recommend that a settlement order prohibit any sale exceeding a specific “discount rate,” any sale accompanied by an arbitration agreement, and any sale in a jurisdiction other than the court approving the original settlement.
An aquatic safety expert in one of our drowning cases–the tragic pool drowning death of a child–testified that in all his forensic work, he has never seen a state with more detailed, thorough, and readily available pool safety standards than the codes and publications in Washington State.
Drowning is the second leading cause of injury-related deaths of U.S. children ages 1-14, and among 1-4-year old children, most drownings occur in residential swimming pools. Washington has enacted detailed pool barrier requirements for two reasons: (1) children are attracted to water, and (2) the “human gate,” i.e. a parent or caretaker, is not effective 100% of the time. Most young child drownings occur within five minutes of the child being seen inside the home.
Many pool barrier standards are described in WAC 246-260-031 , found here. Fences must be either five or six feet high (depending on the type of pool and use) and constructed in a way that does not allow children to climb. Access gates or doors must be self-closing and self-latching when opened from any distance. The latch must not be accessible to children.
Washington’s Department of Health posts publications online, and the Washington State Environmental Health Association publishes its “Pool Operator’s Manual” containing guidance for recreational pool owners and operators.
The “Pool Operator’s Manual” warns, “you are choosing to be part of the industry and to assume the special risks and rewards that go along with pool ownership.” Pool operators are required to anticipate that children will not always be under direct parental supervision, and that children are creative in their exploration. The manual encourages operators to invite a parent of a 3-4-year old child to inspect the facility for access points, for precisely this reason.
The Department of Health identifies two more critical features of a safe gate design: (1) the gate should open outward (pull rather than push), and (2) the gate must be constructed to function properly in spite of wear and tear.
These requirements are relatively simple and inexpensive to implement, and they save lives every day.
Several news organizations are reporting that the death of Hank Williams Hoskins Sr. resulted from a “severed” air hose when he was diving off the San Juan Islands on October 26. Mr. Hoskins, 40, was apparently a commercial diver diving without a backup air supply (in many circumstances this is totally normal). The county medical examiner blamed the death on an “unsafe dive operation,” with disregard for emergency procedures, according to the Bellingham Herald.
While I have yet to see any explanation as to exactly what happened under water, this is unusual in a number of ways. First, air hoses do not sever easily. Divers routinely dive in caves, ship wrecks, and around sea life, all of which could pose a danger to a fragile air supply. But the hoses attached to air regulators are not thin or delicate for exactly these reasons.
If the commercial dive operation involved an increased risk of severing hoses, as a Divemaster I would expect divers to have secondary emergency air supplies–a second air tank connected to a different regulator. Commercial divers who dive deeper than 130 ft and/or stay at depth for more than 10-20 minutes often use secondary tanks at decompression stops. Either of these would have been helpful in the event of an emergency.
But perhaps the most basic safety requirement of Scuba diving that could have prevented this death is the buddy system. Divers are not supposed to dive alone. The first stage of dive regulators (which attaches to the tank) connects to two second stages (mouthpieces) so in the event of an emergency like a malfunctioning air supply, a diver can breathe off his buddy’s air.
News reports do not describe exactly what happened, but in most cases safety precautions like the above prevent underwater emergencies from becoming drowning deaths.
(Note: the picture above is an example only. It hasn’t been reported what brand or type of regulator was used.)
Saturday was the one year anniversary of Ride the Ducks Crash on the Aurora Bridge. As you may know our firm represents 20 of the victims.
Last Friday, the owner of Ride the Ducks Seattle (RTDS) went on a media campaign proclaiming at every opportunity that he wants a “global mediation” where everyone can be treated fairly and the cases can be resolved. This is an effective way for RTDS to convey in a single message to the media and the public that it cares about the victims and is taking responsibility.
But how genuine is it?
Ride the Ducks did propose global mediation involving five defendants and 60 or more plaintiffs, plus dozens more attorneys. They did so by group email. Not a proposed stipulation, not with prior agreement by other defendants, not an actual plan, just a group email. Like how you might throw out an idea for a theme party.
For point of reference, things Ride the Ducks felt warranted actual letterhead or pleading paper have included (1) leveling personal attacks at/scolding Karen for posting a picture of the “Duck Nest” on social media, which RTDS has now broadcast on local news networks, (2) demanding everything we have compiled during our investigation in preparation for the litigation, and (3) scheduling meetings about the case schedule.
For further point of reference, the parties spent hours filing cross motions about when the trial date should be, with the defendants wanting to push it out to June 2019. But this proposed early global mediation, where everyone will be treated so fairly, warrants a group email.
How else is Ride the Ducks taking responsibility and furthering its desire to globally mediate? The company:
- Spent the week of the anniversary hounding us over our objection to producing the fruits of our investigation, and then, ignoring that we twice asked why the issue needed to be debated that week, unilaterally scheduled a discovery conference on Friday right before the memorial service for the Ride the Ducks victims at North Seattle College. We were scheduled to attend to be supportive of our clients, because that’s what we do. Context reminder: trial is two years from now.
- Hasn’t bothered to collect medical records to see all of the harm the crash caused (an obvious prerequisite for mediation), and yet…
- Thought it was important to demand the STD history of the victims in discovery.
What else is Ride the Ducks doing to take responsibility? Blaming lawyers, naturally.
Brian Tracey (owner) stated to Q13: “Most aggressive attorneys will get to trial first and get the lion’s share of the money. I don’t want it to happen, I want everybody to be treated fairly.”
Here’s what is actually going on. Many of the cases filed early after the crash had trial dates as early as November 2016 (two months from now). All of the cases have since been set on the same modified case schedule with a trial date in September 2018. Judges handling the cases have requested that all parties file lawsuits in time for their cases to be tried beginning September 2018. You can decide for yourself if Mr. Tracey’s statement is (a) accurate or (b) a clever way to abscond with the moral high ground and blame lawyers for the lack of a resolution.
This is not the first time Mr. Tracey has gone out of his way to blame lawyers for his company’s bad PR. He blamed Karen and other plaintiffs’ lawyers for a “campaign to discredit RTDS’ safety worthiness.” This is a company which, in addition to the horrific crash that killed five people, admitted to 463 safety violations. A company with only half of its fleet allowed to conduct tours. A company which, the lawsuits allege, declined to implement critical, manufacturer-recommended safety fixes “to avoid axle fractures” (what the preliminary NTSB report concluded had happened) that were supposed to be completed “prior to operating 2014.” Somehow trial lawyers and their photographs of Duck vehicles are to blame for bad PR.
You can always keep blaming us lawyers if you want to duck responsibility. We can take it. But don’t try to fix your PR problem by giving victims an illusory hope of closure for an extremely traumatic and life-changing event. On the anniversary no less. They’re suffering enough.
Here’s an article about the victims, which is what the anniversary should be about.
Do you know how often sleeping kids love hearing electric guitar? Pretty much never. I used to have a headphone amp device that made for so-so sound and looked like a walkman on steroids and probably cost $150. Who knew you could get nearly full amp sound with effects in the size of a pack of gum and for the cost of cheap toaster? Now nobody has to hear how rusty I am.
I have a years-long habit of buying the tools I need only after I discover I need them the hard way. This means that my first try at almost anything is a disaster. When the guys at Home Depot start chuckling when you come back in for the fourth time in a weekend, it’s time to buy better tools.
A couple years ago, because I did fine with baseboards, I thought crown molding would be cake. I spent most of the afternoon banging my head against the wall, and then the other wall, and then the other wall…
This time I had a proper miter saw and a crown molding jig, which is a must-have to get the angles and cuts right consistently. This weekend I conquered crown molding, my nemesis, in about an hour, with no head wounds, and lots of excuses to use the nail gun.
An appellate decision just came down from Division 3 further protecting tenant security deposits. In Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate, the court addresses the burden on landlords to prove an exception to the 14-day deposit rule.
Briefly, RCW 59.18.280 requires landlords, within 14 days of termination of the rental agreement and move-out, to return the security deposit, less any deductions described in a “full and specific statement of the basis for retaining any of the deposit.” The same statute offers landlords an escape: “The landlord is also barred in any action brought by the tenant to recover the deposit from asserting any claim or raising any defense for retaining any of the deposit unless the landlord shows that circumstances beyond the landlord’s control prevented the landlord from providing the statement within the fourteen days.”
In Goodeill, the court elaborated on the burden to prove such circumstances: “We hold that a landlord may not avail itself of RCW 59.18.280′ s exception unless it accounts for any active or passive delays sufficient to show that it made a conscientious attempt to comply with the 14 day statutory notice.” The facts of the case are too detailed to summarize here, but the story is typical. The landlord interpreted the statute to mean that only an estimate is due within 14 days, and that because repair work was necessary by two or more service providers, it was categorically not feasible to comply with RCW 59.18.280’s 14-day requirement. As a result, the plaintiff/tenant did not receive her “full and specific statement” until 43 days after move-out. At small claims court, the landlord argued that other small claims court judges had generally agreed, but had no appellate law supporting that position.
In reaching its decision, the Goodeill court reasoned that the defendant/landlord failed to act with reasonable diligence in scheduling repairs and obtaining cost invoices well before the 14-day period expired. The length of the delay seems particularly offensive to the court: “[The landlord’s] evidence falls woefully short of showing that circumstances beyond its control prevented it from timely providing Ms. Goodeill the statutory notice.” The plaintiff/tenant was entitled to her full deposit back, regardless of whether or not the repairs were justified.
This is a cautionary tale for landlords that just because you need to hire professional cleaners or repair contractors doesn’t mean you can automatically justify significant delays past the 14-day deadline.
Probably for generational reasons, I have written and spoken at CLEs quite a bit about discovery of social media in civil litigation, in particular personal injury litigation. At the extremes, defense lawyers want an entire Facebook account, and plaintiff’s lawyers want a privilege that doesn’t even exist for personal diaries.
There is no case law on this in Washington, probably because so few discovery issues ever reach the appellate level. Below is a list of cases and some analysis regarding the proper scope of social media discovery taken from a WSBA seminar I wrote for and spoke at. The short version is this. Facebook can no longer be considered a “social networking” tool. It is a member-controlled posting environment, like a listserv only more restrictive, an email account, and an instant messenger/texting account, all in one. It is no more appropriate to demand an entire Facebook account than it is to demand an entire Gmail account. Conversely, it makes no more sense to deem all of Facebook off limits than it would to declare written communications about a legal claim categorically irrelevant.
The middle ground is to treat social media the same as we treat any pile of documents. One party can request that the other party go through the documents and produce those relevant or related to x, y, and z. Thus, although it is easy to get lost in the technical details of social media and national case law, there is no reason to stray too far from CR 26 and the common law interpreting it. Social media materials should be treated the same as any other data or documents.
Nevertheless, the below materials may help better explain the considerations and analysis specific to social media.
Scope of Discoverable Social Media: What Is “Reasonably Calculated” Based on the Type of Case?
Civil Rule 26(b)(1) provides, “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action… .” Though the rule is much broader than the tests applied to admissibility at trial, discovery methods must be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
The few Washington appeals cases to address the application of the CR 26 standard suggest that a party seeking discovery should be able to demonstrate (1) a cognizable goal for the discovery—what the party hopes to obtain, (2) that the material sought is probative of an issue in controversy—why the party is entitled to it, and (3) that the method used is reasonably commensurate with that purpose—how the party obtains the information. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Koenig, 160 Wn. App. 883, 250 P.3d 113 (Div. 2 2011); Morgan v. PeaceHealth, Inc., 101 Wn. App. 750, 14 P.3d 773 (Div. 1 2000). Thus, a party should narrow the request to avoid inclusion of information and documents that are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
With social media discovery, this task can sometimes prove pragmatically difficult and highly debatable. Because Washington cases offer little insight into this specific issue, below is a summary of how courts across the country have addressed discovery of social media in various contexts.
Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Related to Social Media Discovery
Holland v. Barfield, 35 So.3d 953 (Fla. 2010). The trial court ordered a defendant in a wrongful death action to produce her entire computer hard drive and cell phone. The plaintiff sought evidence of communication amongst the defendants through Facebook and Myspace. Emphasizing that the request sought the electronic media themselves, rather than the information contained therein, the court of appeals holds that such unlimited breadth is not appropriate. It allows the other party complete access to loads of unrelated information without any deference to privileges or rights of privacy. Id. at 956. Holland also notes that there was no evidence of any destruction or thwarting of discovery by the plaintiff, and thus, no need for such a broad scope. See id. at 955-56.
Mackelprang v. Fidelity National Title Agency of Nevada, 2007 WL 119149, 99 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 997 (D. Nev. 2007). The plaintiff sued for sexual harassment in the workplace and ensuing emotional distress. The defendant sought private messages on her Myspace account, believed to be evidence of her sexual promiscuity and admissions about the subject matter of the litigation. This casts too wide a net, the court holds, because it allows the defendant access to a great deal of other intensely private information not related to the lawsuit. Any little detail communicated by a plaintiff could “in some theoretical sense be reflective of her emotional state,” but that is not justification for the breadth of the inquiry.
Barnes v. Cus Nashville, LLC, 2010 WL 2265668 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (creating a Facebook account for the court and allowing the judge to “friend” the litigants).
Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, 2009 WL 3724968, 1-2 (D.Conn. 2009). The court emphasizes that relevance is in the eye of the beholder, and the plaintiff offered no guidance as to how she determined which documents to produce. Concluding that there was a large discrepancy in potentially relevant material between what was produced and the 750 total pages of documents, the court hands over the complete copy of all Facebook documents.
McMillen v. Hummingbird 12 Speedway, Inc., 2010 WL 4403285 (Pa.Com.Pl. Sept. 9, 2010). The plaintiff in a personal injury case belonged to Facebook and MySpace, and had posted information on those sites about trips he had taken. Defendant asked for login information to his social media sites. Plaintiff argued that social media communications were confidential, which implied a new privileged under Pennsylvania law. The court rejects that argument and declines to find a new privilege, emphasizing that social media tools are used to network and meet new people. Even if social media users communicate on private matters, the nature of the sites dispels an expectation of confidentiality. The court cites Facebook and MySpace policy allowing disclosure of information in certain circumstances to support the position that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. (Note that Facebook’s posted policy on divulging content, as well as privacy settings, have changed in many ways since this case.)
Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 30 Misc.3d 426, 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (2010). The facts here are nearly identical to McMillen. Plaintiff claimed permanent injury, putting loss of enjoyment of life at issue. The public portions of her social media pages revealed traveling, an “active lifestyle.” Plaintiff refused to answer questions about social media at her deposition. Defendant then sought “full access to and copies” of all Facebook and MySpace records. The court holds the material discoverable, noting that social media sites are about sharing information. The court observes as follows:
Thus, it is reasonable to infer from the limited postings on plaintiff’s public Facebook and MySpace profile pages that her private pages may contain material and information that are relevant to her claims or that may lead to the disclosure of admissible evidence. To deny defendant an opportunity to access these sites not only would go against the liberal discovery policies of New York favoring pretrial disclosure, but would condone plaintiff’s attempt to hide relevant information behind self-regulated privacy settings.
Addressing Plaintiff’s raised Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, the court finds no reasonable expectation of privacy.
E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., 270 F.R.D. 430, 436-37 (S.D. Ill. 2010). EEOC sued on behalf of employees for sexual discrimination, which included an emotional distress claim. The court endeavors to delineate the “broad limits—but limits nevertheless—on the discoverability of social communications in light of a subject as amorphous as emotional and mental health, and to do so in a way that provides meaningful direction to the parties.” Id. at 434. The court holds as follows:
(1) Privacy settings and the user’s expectations of privacy are not a basis to completely shield discovery, but may be relevant to a protective order in determining whether a request is burdensome or oppressive or otherwise improper. Id.
(2) The contours of social media communications relevant to emotional distress are difficult to define, but “that does not mean that everything must be disclosed.” With no finding that the plaintiff’s responses to tailored requests were deficient, complete disclosure of site material is not necessary. Id.
(3) The scope of allowable discovery is broader than communications related directly to the issues raised in Plaintiff’s complaint. A wider net may retrieve communications related to injury or credibility, which is discoverable. Id. at 435-36.
(4) “With these considerations in mind, the court determines that the appropriate scope of relevance is any profiles, postings, or messages (including status updates, wall comments, causes joined, groups joined, activity streams, blog entries) and SNS applications … that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, as well as communications that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably be expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling, or mental state.” Id. at 436. This rule applies to third-party communications with the plaintiffs, as well as photographs and videos posted by the plaintiffs. Photos and videos where the plaintiffs are merely tagged are less likely to be relevant.
Patterson v. Turner Constr. Co., 88 A.3d 617, 931 N.Y.S.2d 311 (2011). Patterson sued for personal injuries and the defendant moved to compel production of all of Patterson’s Facebook records after the subject incident. The trial court reviewed the social media materials in camera and determined that at least some of the discovery “will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence,” but that it is possible that not all Facebook communications are related to issues in the lawsuit. The appeals court reversed and remanded for more specific identification of Patterson’s relevant Facebook information, specifically that which may contradict allegations of injury. However, the court also reasons that Patterson’s Facebook materials are not shielded from discovery merely by use of privacy settings, just as a written personal diary may be discoverable.
Held v. Ferrellgas, 14 Inc., 2011 WL 3 896513, * 1 (D. Kan. Aug. 31, 20 11). In an employment discrimination case, the defendant sought the plaintiff’s Facebook data. The court found such material relevant to the case. Further, the court endorsed both the time-scope and manner of discovery, which requested only data during the plaintiff’s employment, and allowed the plaintiff to download and produce the data himself rather than provide direct access.
Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388-89 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
Tompkins is a slip and fall case where defendant requested releases to obtain social media site information. The court holds as follows:
I agree that material posted on a “private” Facebook page, that is accessible to a selected group of recipients but not available for viewing by the general public, is generally not privileged, nor is it protected by common law or civil law notions of privacy. Nevertheless, the Defendant does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public view. Rather, consistent with Rule 26(b) and with the cases cited by both Plaintiff and Defendant, there must be a threshold showing that the requested information is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Otherwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engage in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff’s Facebook account.
Id. at 388. The court distinguishes McMillen and Romano, noting that the alleged threshold evidence for the relevance of the inquiry, a picture of the plaintiff holding her dog, was not inconsistent with the plaintiff’s allegations. The court concludes, “based on what has been provided to this Court, Defendant has not made a sufficient predicate showing that the material it seeks is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. at 389. Further, the court finds, a request for the entire account was overly broad.
Reid v. Ingerman Smith LLP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 176 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). In a sexual harassment lawsuit, the court found social media materials largely relevant, with minimal reasonable expectations of privacy. The court’s reasoning and citations are quoted below.
Although the law regarding the scope of discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”) is still unsettled, there is no dispute that social media information may be a source of relevant information that is discoverable. Courts have found, particularly in cases involving claims of personal injuries, that social media information may reflect a “plaintiff’s emotional or mental state, her physical condition, activity level, employment, this litigation, and the injuries and damages claimed.” See, e.g., Sourdiff v. Texas Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, 2011 WL 7560647, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). For example, where a plaintiff puts her emotional well-being at issue when asserting claims of sexual harassment or discrimination as in this action, some courts have found that “Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and state of mind at the time of the content’s posting.” Bass v. Miss Porter’s School, 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. Conn. 2009); see also Glazer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1197167, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (in employment discrimination case, plaintiff’s chats with online psychic revealed her “work performance, relationships with co-workers, views regarding her treatment . . . emotional state before, during, and after her employment, efforts to mitigate damages”).
On the other hand, as other courts have observed, the “relevance of the content of Plaintiff’s Facebook usage . . . is more in the eye of the beholder than subject to strict legal demarcations.” Bass 2009 WL 3724968, at *1. Whether electronically stored and dissimated [sic] on the Internet or not, “anything that a person says or does might in some theoretical sense be reflective of her emotional state.” Rozell v. Ross-Holst, 2006 WL 163143, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
The court examined the plaintiff’s social media materials and determined that both the public and private materials contained probative evidence of her mental state and participation in activities, which were relevant to her damages claim. Citing New York precedent allowing discovery of diaries containing contemporaneous mental states and impressions of the parties, the court draws no material distinction between such diaries and Facebook privacy settings. Further, the plaintiff had no “justifiable expectation that her [Facebook] friends would keep her profile private” (internal quotations omitted), and the wider the circle of friends, the more likely it is that posts would be viewed by someone the Facebook user does not foresee. Electronic communications in general may come with a lower expectation of privacy.
Nevertheless, the court declines to order production of all Facebook materials because “not all postings will be relevant to her claims.” The court applies a standard that the plaintiff must disclose social media communications and photographs “that reveal, refer, or relate to any emotion, feeling, or mental state, and that reveal, refer, or relate to events that could reasonably [be] expected to produce a significant emotion, feeling or mental state” (internal quotations omitted). In its order, the court limits the time-scope of production and addresses application to each Facebook function (e.g. tagging, photographs, etc.).
McCann v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of New York, 78 A.D.3d 1524, 910 N.Y.S.2d 614 (N.Y. App.Div. 2010) (finding that defendant “failed to establish a factual predicate with respect to the relevancy of the evidence,” and that “defendant essentially sought permission to conduct ‘a fishing expedition’ into plaintiff’s Facebook account based on the mere hope of finding relevant evidence”).
Methods of Discovery: Production of Social Media Content vs. Methods of Direct Access
In the early stages of discovery battles over social media, some courts required that litigants provide direct access (login and password) for their social media accounts. These decisions appear to result from a litigant asserting a privilege that did not exist, a poor understanding of how social media platforms are used, or a limited and discoverable use of social media. See Romano, Mackelprang, and Bass, supra. Direct access to Facebook, for example, may include some posts to friends, but may also include hundreds of private messages, like emails, which may have no bearing on the litigant’s claims and instead may be very private in nature to the other parties to the messages. The other cases listed above, and most all of the more recent decisions, recognize that social media and its various functions also serve various purposes for each individual. Accordingly, most courts not only decline requests for direct access, but will also narrow the production based on an applied standard or determine firsthand which materials are discoverable.
Other than site inspections, it is very rare in discovery that a party is allowed direct access to records that are not by nature entirely at issue in the case (e.g. medical records in a personal injury case, an issue governed by statute), particularly when the privacy of non-litigants is involved. For example, in an employment discharge case, demanding all social media records from the employee-plaintiff may be similarly unfair and invasive as the employee demanding all emails from the employer, regardless of the participants or subject. Both could be described not just as a “fishing expedition,” but a “net fishing expedition,” scraping up everything on the sea floor.
To cast a wide net, litigants must have a compelling justification. As the above cases illustrate, a wide net may be justified if a party selects which materials to produce without identifying any basis for the selection, or if a party conceals discoverable materials or otherwise commits misconduct that puts good faith responses in question.
In a previous post I addressed the limitations on tenants’ legal remedies against landlords. Today the Washington Supreme Court unanimously found that “actual damages” under RCW 59.18.085 does not include emotional distress damages in connection with tenant relocation from a condemned dwelling. The Court’s decision is based on its interpretation of the legislative intent of the Residential Landlord Tenant Act (“RLTA”). In very general terms, the Court reasons that the RLTA expressly prescribes detailed remedies for relocation from a condemned dwelling, such as relocation expenses and deposit, and that where emotional distress damages are not one of the prescribed remedies, they should not be read into the statute.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning confirms again that while the RLTA is generally very favorable to tenants as consumers, it typically does not form the basis for non-economic damages. For the lawyer audience, however, just because the RLTA does not create a cause of action itself does not mean violation of a provision by a landlord will not constitute evidence of negligence or potentially negligence per se under RCW 5.40.050, as supporting a common law cause of action.